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One of the best-documented propositions in the field of finance is that, on
average, investors have received higher rates of return on investment
securities for bearing greater risk. This chapter looks at the historical
evidence regarding risk and return, explains the fundamentals of port-
folio and asset-pricing theory, and then goes on to take a new look at the
relationship between risk and return using some unexplored risk mea-
sures that seem to capture quite closely the actual risks being valued in
the market.
2.1 Some Historical Evidence
Risk is a most slippery and elusive concept. It is hard for investors—let
alone economists—to agree on a precise definition. The dictionary de-
fines risk as the possibility of suffering harm or loss. If I buy one-year
Treasury bills to yield, say, 10 percent and hold them until they mature, I
am virtually certain of earning a 10 percent monetary return before
income taxes. The possibility of loss is so small as to be considered
nonexistent. But if I hold common stock in my local power and light
company for one year on the basis of an anticipated 12.5 percent dividend
return, the possibility of loss increases. The dividend of the company
might be cut and, more important, the market price at the end of the year
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could be much lower, so that I might suffer a serious net loss. Risk is the
chance that expected security returns will not materialize and, in particu-
lar, that the securities I hold will fall in price.
Once academics had accepted the idea that risk for investors is related
to the chance of disappointment in achieving expected security returns, a
natural measure suggested itself—the probable variability or dispersion
of future returns. Thus, financial risk has generally been defined as the
variance or standard deviation of returns.
1
Empirical studies of broad classes of securities confirm the general
relationship between risk and return. The most thorough recent study has
been done by Ibbotson and Sinquefield (1979). Their data covered the
period 1926 through 1978. The results are shown in Table 2.1.
A quick glance shows that, over long periods of time, common stocks
have, on average, provided relatively generous total rates of return.
These returns, including dividends and capital gains, have exceeded by a
substantial margin the returns from long-term corporate bonds and U.S.
Treasury bills. The stock returns have also tended to be well in excess of
the inflation rate as measured by the annual rate of increase in consumer
prices. The data show, however, that common stock returns are highly
variable as measured by the standard deviation and the range of annual
returns shown in the last three columns of the table. Returns from
equities have ranged from a gain of over 50 percent (in 1933) to a loss of
almost the same magnitude (in 1931). Clearly, the extra returns that have
been available to investors from stocks have come at the expense of
assuming considerably higher risk.
The patterns evident in Ibbotson and Sinquefield's chart also appear
when the returns and risks of individual stock portfolios are compared.
Indeed, most of the differences that exist in the returns from different
mutual funds can be explained by differences in the risk they have
assumed. However, there are ways in which investors can reduce the risks
they take. This brings us to the subject of modern portfolio theory.
2.2 Reducing Risk: Modern Portfolio Theory
Portfolio theory begins with the premise that all investors are risk
averse. They want high returns and guaranteed outcomes. The theory
tells investors how to combine stocks in their portfolios to give them the
least risk possible, consistent with the return they seek. It also gives a
rigorous mathematical justification for the time-honored investment
1. Variance is defined as the average squared deviation of the (periodic) investment
returns from their average. The square root of the variance is the standard deviation and is
also often used to measure variability and, thus, risk. While it is true that only downward
surprises constitute risk, as long as the distribution of returns is symmetric, a variance
measure will serve as a good proxy for the chance of disappointment.o •> < 3
3 «
re < lfS re < «
X) g C -S
6 c3 3 M
3 D O O






































5/330 Burton G. Malkiel
maxim that diversification is a sensible strategy for individuals who like to
reduce their risks. The basic idea was that a portfolio of risky (volatile)
stocks can be put together in such a way as to be less risky than any one of
the individual stocks in it. A simple illustration will make the whole game
clear.
Let us suppose we have an island economy with only two businesses.
The first is a large resort with beaches, tennis courts, a golf course, and
the like. The second is a manufacturer of umbrellas. Weather affects the
fortunes of both. During sunny seasons the resort does a booming busi-
ness and umbrella sales plummet. During rainy seasons the resort owner
does very poorly, while the umbrella manufacturer enjoys high sales and
large profits. Table 2.2 shows some hypothetical earnings for the two
businesses during the different seasons. I assume that all earnings are
paid out as dividends, so these are also the returns paid out to investors.
Suppose that, on average, one-half the seasons are sunny and one-half
are rainy (i.e., the probability of a sunny or rainy season is one-half). An
investor who bought stock in the umbrella manufacturer would find that
half the time he earned a 50 percent return and half the time he lost 25
percent of his investment. On average, he would earn a return of 12.5
percent. This is what we call the investor's expected return. Similarly,
investment in the resort would produce the same results. Investing in
either one of these businesses would be fairly risky, however, because the
results are quite variable, and there could be several sunny or rainy
seasons in a row.
Suppose, however, that instead of buying only one security an investor
with two dollars diversified and put half his money in the umbrella
manufacturer's and half in the resort owner's business. In sunny seasons,
a one-dollar investment in the resort would produce a fifty-cent return,
while a one-dollar investment in the umbrella manufacturer would lose
twenty-five cents. The investor's total return would be twenty-five cents,
which is 12.5 percent of his total investment of two dollars.
Note that during rainy seasons exactly the same thing happens—only
the names are changed. Investment in the umbrella manufacturer pro-
duces a good 50 percent return while the investment in the resort loses 25
percent. Again, however, the diversized investor makes a 12.5 percent
return on his total investment.
This simple illustration points out the basic advantage of diversifica-
tion. Whatever happens to the weather, and thus to the island economy,
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making a 12.5 percent return each year. The trick that made the game
work was that while both companies were risky (returns were variable
from year to year), the companies were affected differently by weather
conditions. As long as there is some lack of parallelism in the fortunes of
the individual companies in the economy, diversification will always
reduce risk. In the present case, where there is a perfect negative rela-
tionship between the companies' fortunes (one always does well when the
other does poorly), diversification can totally eliminate risk.
Of course, there is always a rub, and the rub in this case is that the
fortunes of most companies move pretty much in tandem. When there is a
recession and people are unemployed, they may buy neither summer
vacations nor umbrellas. Therefore, one should not expect in practice to
get the neat total risk elimination just shown. Nevertheless, since com-
pany fortunes do not always move completely in parallel, investment in a
diversified portfolio of stocks is likely to be less risky than investment in
one or two single securities. While a portfolio of General Motors and its
major steel and tire supplier would not reduce risk much, if at all, a
portfolio of GM and a defense contractor in a depressed area might
reduce risk substantially.
The example may seem a bit strained, and most investors will realize
that when the market gets clobbered just about all stocks go down. Still,
at least at certain times, some stocks do move against the market. Gold
stocks are often given as an example of securities that do not typically
move in the same direction as the general market. Similarly, international
diversification can reduce risk. The point to realize in setting up a port-
folio is that true diversification of a portfolio depends on having stocks
that are not all dependent on the same economic variables (total spending
in the economy, inflation rates, etc.). Wise investors will diversify their
portfolios not by names or industries but by the determinants that in-
fluence the fluctuations of various securities.
2.3 Modeling Risk: The Capital-Asset Pricing Model (CAPM)
Portfolio theory has important implications for how stocks are actually
valued. If investors seek to reduce risk in anything like the manner
described by portfolio theorists, the stock market will tend to reflect these
risk-reducing activities. This brings us to what is called the "Capital-Asset
Pricing Model."
I have mentioned that the reason diversification cannot usually pro-
duce the miracle of risk elimination is that usually stocks tend to move up
and down together. Still, diversification is worthwhile—it can eliminate
some risks. What the CAPM did was to focus directly on what part of a
security's risk could be eliminated by diversification and what part could
not.32 Burton G. Malkiel
The theory begins by classifying the sources of the variability of an
individual stock. Part of total risk or variability may be called the secur-
ity's systematic risk, arising from the basic variability of stock prices in
general and the tendency for all stocks to go along with the general
market, at least to some extent. The remaining variability in a stock's
returns is called unsystematic risk and results from factors peculiar to that
particular company, for example, a strike, the discovery of a new prod-
uct, and so on.
Systematic risk, also called market risk, captures the reaction of indi-
vidual stocks (or portfolios) to general market swings. Some stocks and
portfolios tend to be very sensitive to market movements. Others are
more stable. This relative volatility or sensitivity to market moves can be
estimated on the basis of the past record, and is popularly known as the
beta calculation. This calculation is essentially a comparison between the
movements of an individual stock (or portfolio) and the movements of
the market as a whole. It is a numerical description of systematic risk.
The calculation begins by assigning a beta of 1 to a broad market index,
such as the NYSE index or the S&P 500. If a stock has a beta of 2, then on
average it swings twice as far as the market. If the market goes up 10
percent, the stock rises 20 percent. If a stock has a beta of 0.5, it tends to
be more stable than the market (it will go up or down 5 percent when the
market rises or declines 10 percent). Professionals often call high-beta
stocks aggressive investments and label low-beta stocks as defensive.
Now the important thing to realize is that systematic risk cannot be
eliminated by diversification. It is precisely because all stocks move more
or less in tandem (a large share of their variability is systematic) that even
diversified stock portfolios are risky. Indeed, if I diversified extremely
broadly by buying a share in the S&P index (which by definition has a beta
of 1), I would still have quite variable (risky) returns because the market
as a whole fluctuates widely.
Unsystematic risk is the variability in stock prices (and, therefore, in
returns from stocks) that results from factors peculiar to an individual
company. Receipt of a large new contract, discovery of mineral resources
on the company's property, labor difficulties, the revelation that the
corporation's treasurer has had his hand in the company till—all can
make a stock's price move independently of the market. The risk associ-
ated with such variability is precisely the kind that diversification can
reduce. The whole point of portfolio theory was that, to the extent that
stocks do not move in tandem all the time, variations in the rehirns from
any one security will tend to be washed away or smoothed out by
complementary variation in the returns from other securities.
Figure 2.1 illustrates the important relationship between diversifica-
tion and total risk. Suppose we randomly selected securities for our
portfolio that tended on average to be just as volatile as the market. (The
average betas for the securities in our portfolio will always be equal to 1.)33 Risk and Return
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Fig. 2.1 How Diversification Reduces Risk. From Franco Modigliani
and Gerald A. Pogue, "An Introduction to Risk and Return,"
The Financial Analyst Journal, March-April 1974.
Figure 2.1 shows that as we add more securities, the total risk of our
portfolio declines, especially at the start.
When ten securities are selected for our portfolio, a good deal of the
unsystematic risk is eliminated, and additional diversification yields little
further risk reduction. By the time twenty securities are in the portfolio,
the unsystematic part of risk is substantially eliminated, and our portfolio
(with a beta of 1) will tend to move up and down essentially in tandem
with the market.
Now comes the key step in the argument. Both financial theorists and
practitioners had agreed for years that investors should be compensated
for taking on more risk by receiving a higher expected return. Stock
prices must therefore adjust to offer higher returns where more risk is
perceived, to ensure that all securities are held by someone. What is
different about the new theory is the definition and measurement of risk.
Before the advent of the CAPM, it was often suggested that the return on
each security would be related to the total risk inherent in that security. It
was believed that the return from holding a security would vary with the
instability of that security's particular performance, that is, with the
variability or standard deviation of the returns it produced. The new
theory says that the total risk of each individual security is irrelevant.
Only the systematic component of that total instability is relevant for
valuation. Because stocks can be combined in portfolios to eliminate
specific risk (see Figure 2.1), only the undiversifiable or systematic part of
the risk will command a risk premium (i.e., an extra return over and
above that obtainable from a riskless asset). Investors will not get paid for
bearing risks that can be diversified away. The only part of total risk that
investors will get paid for bearing is systematic risk, the risk that diver-
sification cannot eliminate. This is the basic logic behind the CAPM.
If investors did get an extra return (a risk premium) for bearing














Fig. 2.2 Risk and Return According to the Capital-Asset Pricing
Model. Rate of return = risk-free rate + beta x (return from
market — risk-free rate). In other words, the return you get on
any stock or portfolio increases directly with the beta value you
assume. From A Random Walk down Wall Street, 2d college
ed. © 1981 by Burton G. Malkiel. Used with permission of the
publishers, W. W. Norton & Company, Inc.
amounts of unsystematic risk would give larger returns than equally risky
portfolios of stocks with less unsystematic risk. Investors would snap at
these higher returns by bidding up the prices of stocks with large unsys-
tematic risk and selling stocks with equivalent betas but lower unsystem-
atic risk. This would continue until the prospective returns of stocks with
the same betas were equalized and no risk premium could be obtained for
bearing unsystematic risk. Thus, the CAPM says that returns for any
stock (or portfolio) will be related to beta, the systematic risk that cannot
be diversified away. Any other results would be inconsistent with the
existence of efficient markets.
The key relationship of the theory is shown in Figure 2.2 (For the
moment, ignore the dashed line in the diagram.) As the systematic risk
(beta) of an individual stock (or portfolio) increases, so does the return
an investor should expect. If an investor's portfolio has a beta of zero, as
might be the case if all his funds were invested in a very short-term
Treasury bill (beta would be zero since the returns from the certificate
would not vary at all with swings in the stock market), the investor would
receive some modest rate of return, which is generally called the risk-free
rate of interest.
2 As the individual takes on more risk, however, the
return should increase. If the investor holds a portfolio with a beta of 1
(for example, one share in one of the broad stock market averages), his
return will equal the general return from common stocks. This return has
over long periods of time exceeded the risk-free rate of interest, but the
investment is a risky one. In certain periods the return is much less than
2. Of course, the yield from a Treasury bill is risk free only in a nominal sense. An
investor will be guaranteed a certain money rate of return from the investment but his/her
real rate of return will be uncertain. The risk-return relationships described here concern
relationships between nominal returns before inflation and before taxes.35 Risk and Return
the risk-free rate and involves taking substantial losses. This, as we have
said, is precisely what is meant by risk.
Figure 2.2 shows that a number of different expected returns are
possible simply by adjusting the beta of the portfolio. For example,
suppose an investor put half of her money in a T-bill and half in a share of
the market averages. In this case she would receive a return midway
between the risk-free return and the return from the market, and her
portfolio would have an average beta of 0.5. The theory then asserts very
simply that to ge.t a higher average long-run rate of return, one must
simply increase the beta of the portfolio. An investor can get a portfolio
with a beta larger than 1 either by buying high-beta stocks or by purchas-
ing a portfolio with average volatility on margin.
2.4 Tests of the CAPM Model
Tests of the CAPM have tried to ascertain if security returns are in fact
directly related to beta, as the theory asserts. The early evidence seemed
to support the theory. The relationship between the performance of a
large number of professionally managed funds and the beta measure of
relative volatility was generally consistent with the theory. The portfolio
returns have varied positively with beta in roughly a straight-line manner,
as is shown in Figure 2.3, so that over the long pull, high-beta portfolios
have provided larger total returns than low-risk ones.
Unfortunately, however, as more evidence accumulated, a number of
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Fig. 2.3 Average Annual Return versus Risk: Selected Institutional
Investors, 1965-78. Source: Buck Consultants, Inc. From The
Inflation Beater's Investment Guide: Winning Strategies for the
1980s. © 1980 by Burton G. Malkiel. Used with permission of
the publishers, W. W. Norton & Company, Inc.36 Burton G. Malkiel
relationships found in the market appear to be much flatter than those
implied by the theory. In Figure 2.2, for example, the actual measured
relationships have usually looked more like the dashed line than the solid
line, which represents the theoretical relationship. There seems to be a
phenomenon much like that found at the racetrack, in that low-risk
stocks earn higher returns and high-risk stocks earn lower returns than
the theory predicts. (At the racetrack, long shots seem to go off at much
lower odds than their true probability of winning would indicate, whereas
favorites go off at higher odds than is consistent with their winning
percentages.)
The divergence of theory from evidence is even more striking in the
short run. For some short periods, it may happen that risk and return are
negatively related. In 1972, for example, which was an up-market year, it
turned out that safer (lower-beta) stocks went up more than did more
volatile securities. Fortune magazine commented dryly on this well-
publicized failure: "The results defied the textbooks." What happened
was that in 1972, styles changed in Wall Street, as institutional investors
eschewed younger, more speculative companies, the "faded ladies" of
the late 1960s, and became much more enamored of the highest quality,
most stable leading corporations in the so-called first tier of stocks. It
became clear that beta could not be used to guarantee investors a predict-
able performance over periods of a few months or even a year. And even
over some longer periods of time—when the market has produced a
positive rate of return—investors have actually been penalized for taking
on more risk.
Another problem the theory encounters is the instability of measured
betas. The beta of a stock is measured on the basis of historical rela-
tionships between returns for that stock and the returns from the market.
It turns out that these past betas for individual stocks are relatively poor
predictors of future betas. While the problem is less severe for portfolios,
which are averages of many stocks, it is clear that past betas are quite
imperfect estimates of future volatility numbers. Moreover, as Roll
(1977) has pointed out, it is impossible to observe the market's return
against which we measure beta. In principle, the market includes all
stocks, a variety of other financial instruments, and even nonmarketable
assets. The Standard and Poor's Index (or any other index) is a very
imperfect market proxy at best. And, when we measure "market risk"
using imperfect proxies, we may obtain quite imperfect estimates of
market sensitivity. Roll (1977) showed that by changing the market index
against which betas are measured, one can obtain quite different mea-
sures of the risk level of individual stocks or portfolios and thus quite
different predictions of future returns. It is clear, then, that in judging
risk, beta cannot be a substitute for brains.37 Risk and Return
2.5 Toward a Broader Method of Risk Measurement
To understand the logic of the risk measurement system proposed
here, it is important to remember the correct insight underlying the
CAPM. The only risk that investors should be compensated for bearing is
the risk that cannot be diversified away. Only systematic risk will com-
mand a risk premium in the market. But, the systematic elements of risk
in particular stocks and portfolios may be far more complicated than can
be captured by a beta measure—the tendency of stocks to move more or
less than any particular stock index.
Let us take a look at several other potential systematic risk elements.
Changes in National Income, for example, may affect returns from
individual stocks in a systematic way. This was mentioned earlier in the
illustration of a simple island economy. During a recession, consumers
might buy neither vacations nor umbrellas. Changes in National Income
also mirror the changes in the personal income available to individuals,
and so the systematic relationship between security returns and salary
income can be expected to be important elements in individual behavior.
For example, the worker in a Ford plant will find that a holding of Ford
common stock is particularly risky since job layoffs and poor returns from
Ford stock are likely to occur at the same time. Changes in National
Income may also reflect changes in other forms of property income and
may therefore be relevant for institutional portfolio managers as well.
Changes in interest rates also systematically affect the returns from
individual stocks and are important nondiversifiable risk elements. To
the extent that stocks tend to suffer as interest rates go up, equities are a
risky investment, and those stocks that are particularly vulnerable to
increases in the general level of interest rates are especially risky. Since
fixed-income securities are included in the portfolios of many institu-
tional investors, this systematic risk factor is particularly important for
some of the largest investors in the market. Clearly, then, investors who
think of risk in its broadest and most meaningful sense will be sensitive to
the tendency of stocks to be affected by changes in interest rates.
Changes in the rate of inflation will similarly tend to have systematic
influences on the returns from common stocks. This is so for at least two
reasons. First, an increase in the rate of inflation tends to increase interest
rates and thus may lead to the lower prices of equities just discussed.
Second, increases in inflation may squeeze profit margins for certain
groups of companies such as public utilities, which often find that rate
increases lag behind increases in their costs. On the other hand, inflation
may benefit the prices of some common stocks, such as those in natural
resource industries. Thus, again there are important systematic rela-
tionships between stock returns and economic variables that may not be
captured adequately by a simple beta measure of risk.38 Burton G. Malkiel
The final new risk variable introduced is a measure of the dispersion
among Wall Street security analysts concerning the future earnings and
dividend growth of the company. If analysts differ greatly in their growth
forecasts for a company, we shall consider the stock to be relatively risky.
At first glance, this forecast dispersion variable may seem like a measure
of total variability for a company—precisely the kind of measure that was
used before the advent of the Capital-Asset Pricing Model. While such an
interpretation is possible, the dispersion of analysts' forecasts may actu-
ally serve as a particularly useful proxy for a variety of systematic risks.
The following illustration will explain why.
Suppose we had two companies, one a steel company that is extremely
sensitive to systematic influences in the economy, the other a phar-
maceutical firm that is quite insensitive to economic conditions. It may be
that Wall Street analysts agree completely on how economic conditions
will affect the two companies, but still differ greatly on their economic
forecasts. If this were so, there could be a big dispersion in earnings
forecasts for the steel company (because of the differences in economic
forecasts and the Sensitivity of the company to economic conditions), and
very small differences in forecasts in the drug company (because eco-
nomic conditions have little effect on that company).
Table 2.3 illustrates the situation. Analyst 1 is optimistic about real
growth and convinced that inflation and interest rates will fall. Analyst 2
predicts sluggish real growth but believes that inflation and interest rates
will remain high. The analysts may agree completely on how economic
conditions affect the two companies. Nevertheless, they can differ in their
earnings forecasts, because their economic forecasts differ and the two
companies are not equally sensitive to these economic conditions. The
steel company is very sensitive to GNP growth because it affects sales, to
inflation because it affects raw material prices, and to interest rates
because they affect borrowing costs. Thus, analyst 1 sees strong earnings
growth for the steel company while analyst 2 predicts a very weak
performance. As for the drug company, since, by assumption, it is
relatively unaffected by economic conditions, the analysts agree on their
earnings forecasts despite differences in their economic forecasts. The
important point to note about this illustration is that the company for
which the forecasts differed was the company most sensitive to systematic
risk factors, i.e., the company with the greatest systematic sensitivity to
economic conditions. Hence, differences in analysts' forecasts may be a
most useful proxy for systematic risk in the broadest sense of the term.
2.6 Some Statistical Tests
It is possible to test statistically the influence of variable risk factors on
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that stocks with larger systematic risks ought to promise investors a
higher expected rate of return—the bigger the risk, the larger should be
the reward.
3 Several alternative measures of systematic risk were used in
the analysis.
1. Market Risk: Market risk is measured by beta, the historical sensi-
tivity of the stock to swings in the overall market index. Stocks very
sensitive to fluctuations in the overall market are riskier and therefore
should provide higher anticipated rates of return.
2. Economic Activity Risk: This risk measures the sensitivity of an
individual stock to movements in the level of National Income. It is
estimated on the basis of past sensitivity of a security's return to changes
in National Income. Stocks that are more sensitive to fluctuations in
economic activity will have more systematic risk and hence ought to offer
a larger rate of return.
3. Inflation Risk: Stocks which tend systematically to produce very
poor returns when inflation accelerates are considered to have large
systematic risk with respect to inflation. Hence, stocks with greater
inflation risk should offer a higher anticipated rate of return.
4. Interest Rate Risk: Stocks which are extremely sensitive to interest
rates also contain greater systematic risk. Alternatively, stocks that do
well when interest rates rise would be particularly valuable in portfolios
which contain both stocks and bonds. Thus, stocks that are particularly
sensitive to change in market interest rates should be considered riskier
and hence command a larger prospective rate of return.
5. Dispersion of Analysts' Forecasts: As indicated above, this risk
variable may serve as a good proxy for a variety of systematic risk. The
larger the dispersion of forecasts, the larger the anticipated return ought
to be to the holder of securities.
The hypothesis to be tested is that expected returns on individual
stocks should be related to a variety of risk variables. In order to perform
the test, however, we need some way of measuring expected returns on
individual stocks. We also need expectational data on the forecasts of
security analysts from which we can measure the forecast dispersion
mentioned above. Fortunately, a long-standing study done at Princeton's
Financial Research Center has provided the expectational data we need.
For each year during the 1960s, data were collected from a number of
leading investment houses on forecasts of the long-run growth of di-
vidends and earnings for a substantial sample of investment-grade issues.
We also obtained similar data for the end of 1980 from the Institutional
Brokerage Estimate System (IBES) of the investment firm of Lynch,
Jones, and Ryan. The IBES provided estimates of long-run earnings
growth as well as the dispersion of forecasts.
3. A formal theoretical justification for the hypothesis tested can be found in Malkiel and
Cragg (1980). See also Ross (1976).41 Risk and Return
Anticipated rates of return on individual common stocks were derived
from the standard dividend discount valuation model. According to that
model the worth of a common stock is equal to the present value of the
future stream of dividends an investor can expect to receive from that
stock. It turns out that this model has a very simple implication. The
expected rate of return on any stock can be derived by summing the
dividend yield of the stock and the long-run expected growth rate of the
earnings and dividends per share. An example will make the calculations
clear. Say that American Telephone and Telegraph is selling at a div-
idend yield of approximately 10.5 percent. Say the average Wall Street
forecast for the long-run expected growth rate of dividends is 6 percent. It
will then turn out that a long-run holder of AT&T common stock can
expect a 16.5 percent rate of return from holding AT&T stock. This is
made up of a 10.5 percent dividend yield plus a 6 percent growth rate.
4
We have now discussed the measurement of all the variables used in
the study as well as the hypothesis to be tested. We turn next to the results
of the analysis. Table 2.4 shows the statistical relationship between
expected rates of return for a sample of individual stocks and the five risk
measures listed above. While the pairwise correlation coefficients are not
terribly high they are statistically significant in most instances. Thus, the
results indicate that each of these risk variables does seem to be impor-
tant in explaining the structure of anticipated returns. The t-statistics also
support this conclusion. A handy rough rule is that any t-statistic larger
than 2 indicates a statistically significant relationship.
While the traditional beta measure of risk does seem to be related to
expected returns in the manner described by the theory, it appears that
there are a variety of systematic risk influences on individual stocks and
portfolios. Systematic susceptibility to economic conditions as measured
by National Income, interest rates, and the rate of inflation also seems to
play an important role in explaining differences in expected returns. This
can be seen by looking at the correlation coefficients relating each risk
measure to expected returns and by examining the t-values. The fact that
so many of the t-values are statistically significant in the table suggests
that several systematic risk influences clearly influence expected returns.
Moreover, when several of these systematic risk influences are used
together, a far better explanation of differences in expected returns is
4. If we assume that the price-earnings multiple and dividend yield do not change, even a
short-run holder can expect the same 16.5 percent rate of return. This is so because by
assumption the stock's value will grow at 6.0 percent because of the increase in dividends
and earnings. Hence, an individual selling AT&T stock after a year would realize 6.0
percent appreciation as well as a 10.5 percent dividend return. Although the results are not
reported here, anticipated rates of return were also derived from a somewhat different
version of the standard valuation model that allowed for variable long-term growth rates.
The results were quite similar to those obtained from the simple model, and only the results
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Table 2.5 Multiple Correlation Coefficients Using





















found than can be obtained using any single measure alone. This can be
seen by comparing the multiple correlation coefficients in Table 2.5 with
the single-variable correlations shown in Table 2.4.
5 Although this is not
shown in the table, it should be noted that several of the risk variables
were statistically significant in each year. This indicates that several
systematic risk elements influence expected security returns.
If, however, we wanted for simplicity to select the one risk measure
that is most closely related to expected returns, the traditional beta
measure would probably not be our first choice. The best single risk proxy
appears to be the dispersion of analysts' forecasts. This risk measure
generally produced the highest correlations with expected returns and the
highest t-values in Table 2.4. Companies for which there is a broad
consensus with respect to future earnings and dividends seem to be less
risky (and hence have lower expected returns) than companies for which
there is little agreement among security analysts. It is possible to interpret
this result as contradicting modern asset-pricing theory, which suggests
that total variability per se will not be relevant for valuation. As we have
shown, however, this dispersion of forecasts could well result if different
companies were particularly susceptible to systematic risk elements, and
thus our dispersion measure may be the best individual proxy available to
capture the variety of systematic risk elements to which securities are
subject.
2.7 Implications of the Analysis
The quest for better risk measures is not simply an amusing exercise
that accomplishes only the satisfaction of permitting academics to play
5. In general, the correlations are not as close for 1980.1980 used a different data set and
is therefore not directly comparable. The general findings for 1980 are similar, however.44 Burton G. Malkiel
with their computers. It has important implications for protecting inves-
tors. A good illustration of how a better understanding of the many facets
of risk can aid investors is provided by the recent fascination with so-
called yield-tilted index funds, which had gained a considerable following
in the investment community by the 1980s. Yield-tilted index funds tried
to match closely the general composition of one of the broad stock indices
such as the S&P 500 stock index, but their portfolios were tilted toward
relatively high yield stocks. Such funds were being especially recom-
mended for tax-exempt investors.
The reasoning behind the yield-tilted index fund seemed appealingly
plausible. Since dividends are generally taxed more highly than capital
gains, and since the market equilibrium is presumably achieved on the
basis of after-tax returns, the equilibrium pretax returns for stocks that
pay high dividends ought to be higher than for securities which produce
lower dividends and correspondingly higher capital gains. Hence, the
tax-exempt investor should specialize in buying high-dividend-paying
stocks. In order to avoid the assumption of any greater risk than is
involved in buying the market index, however, this tax-exempt investor
was advised to purchase a yield-tilted index fund, that is, a very broadly
diversified portfolio of high-dividend paying stocks that mirrored the
market index in the sense that it had a beta coefficient precisely equal to
one.
Even on a priori grounds one might question the logic of the yield-tilted
index fund. Many of the largest investors in the market are tax-exempt
(such as pension and endowment funds), and other investors (such as
corporations) actually pay a higher tax on capital gains than on dividend
income.
6 Thus, it is far from clear that many of the most important
investors in the stock market prefer to receive income through capital
gains rather than through dividend payments. But apart from these a
priori arguments, the statistical results just reviewed can be interpreted as
providing another argument against the yield-tilted index fund.
If the traditional beta calculation does not provide a full description of
systematic risk, the yield-tilted index fund may well fail to mirror the
market index. Specifically, during periods when inflation and interest
rates rise, high-dividend stocks may be particularly vulnerable. Public
utility common stocks are a good example. Although they are known as
low-beta stocks, they are likely to have high systematic risk with respect
to interest rates and inflation. This is so not only because they are good
substitutes for fixed-income securities, but also because public utilities
are vulnerable to a profits squeeze during periods of rising inflation
because of regulatory lags and increased borrowing costs. Hence, the
6. For corporate investors, 85 percent of dividend income is excluded from taxable
income while capital gains are taxed at normal gains rates.45 Risk and Return
yield-tilted index fund with beta equal to one may not mirror the market
index when inflation accelerates.
The actual experience of yield-tilted index funds during the 1979-80
period was far from reassuring. The performance of these funds was
significantly worse than that of the market. Of course, we should not
reject a model simply because of its failure over any specific short-term
period. Nevertheless, I believe that an understanding of the wider aspects
of systematic risk, such as provided here, would have helped prevent
what turned out to be (at least over the short term) some serious invest-
ment errors.
Conclusion
I have argued here that no single measure is likely to capture ade-
quately the variety of systematic risk influences on individual stocks and
portfolios. Returns are sensitive to general market swings, to changes in
interest rates and in the rate of inflation, to changes in National Income
and, undoubtedly, to other economic factors as well. Moreover, if one
were to select the best individual risk estimate, the traditional beta
measure would probably not be our first choice. The dispersion of
analysts' forecasts seems to have a closer relationship with expected
returns and may be the best single measure of systematic risk available.
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